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Abstract—Denial of Service (DoS) attacks is one of the 
major threats and among the hardest security problems in 
the Internet world. Of particular concern are Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, whose impact can be 
proportionally severe. With little or no advance warning, an 
attacker can easily exhaust the computing resources of its 
victim within a short period of time. In this paper, we 
study the impact of a UDP flood attack on TCP 
throughput, round-trip time, and CPU utilization for a Web 
Server with the new generation of Linux platform, 
Linux Ubuntu 13. This paper also evaluates the impact of 
various defense mechanisms, including Access 
Control Lists (ACLs), Threshold Limit, Reverse Path 
Forwarding (IP Verify), and Network Load Balancing.  
Threshold Limit is found to be the most effective defense. 
1. INTRODUCTION
A revolution has occurred in the world of computer and 
communication with the advent of the Internet. The Internet 
has become increasingly important to current society; it has 
changed our way of communication, business models, and 
made information publicly accessible quickly and easily 
from almost anywhere, anytime. 
However, with all the advantages of the Internet, there 
are also some disadvantages. There is no absolute security 
in the Internet world, and the hackers can use the Internet to 
launch different types of attacks on a victim network, one 
of which is known as a Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attack.    
A DDoS Attack is one of the most common and major 
threat to the Internet in which the goal of the attacker is to 
consume computer resources of the victim, usually by using 
many computers to send a high volume of seemingly 
legitimate traffic requesting some services from the victim. 
As a result, it creates network congestion on the target, thus 
disrupting its normal Internet operation [1]. 
In particular, a UDP flood attack occurs when an attacker 
crafts numerous packets to random destination ports on the 
victim’s computer. The victim system, on receipt of the 
UDP packet requests, would respond with appropriate 
ICMP packets, if the port is closed [2]. A very large number 
of packet responses would slow down the system or crash. 
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of a UDP flood attack 
on the Web Server with the new generation of Linux 
platform, namely, Linux Ubuntu 13. This paper also 
evaluates the existing defense mechanisms such as 
Access Control Lists (ACL) [3], Threshold Limit [4], IP 
Verify [5], and Network Load Balancing [6]. 
ACLs stop the attack by blocking all private IP addresses 
since they cannot be used on the Internet. Threshold Limit 
stops the attack by limiting the traffic rate up to the 
threshold. In this study, we limited the traffic up to 10000 
packets per second. IP Verify gives the ability to the router 
to verify the reachability of the source IP addresses before 
they can enter the network. If the source IP address is not 
valid, the packet is dropped. Network Load Balancing can 
reduce the impact of the attack by balancing the attack 
traffic to an additional server using different paths and 
cables. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. In the next 
section, the motivation of this paper and the related work on 
DDoS Attacks is discussed. Section 3 covers the 
experimental setup and hardware specification. Section 4 
covers information regarding the traffic measurement 
and data generating tools. Section 5 covers the evaluation 
of a UDP flood attack and defenses, and the last 
sections include the conclusions and future works.  
2. RELATED WORK
Analysis and comparison of DDoS Attack and defense 
mechanisms on different operating systems has been 
conducted by a number of researchers. 
In 2006, Pack and colleagues [7] investigated the 
efficiency of Access Control List against the DDoS Attack. 
The result shows that the number of ACL rules affects the 
collateral damage (legitimate traffic was dropped 
unintentionally). With 5 ACL rules, the number of the 
collateral damage was 45%. However, this number 
significantly reduced to 15% if 50 ACL rules were used. 
In 2009, Lu and colleagues [8] investigated the impact a 
UDP flood attack on the system by using metrics such as 
packet loss rate, delay, and jitter. The testbed consists of 9 
routers and 14 computers with Intel Celeron 2.1 and 512 
memory running Linux. Iperf was a primary tool used to 
generate UDP traffic at 10, 15, 20 and 30Mbps. The result 
shows that without the attack there was no packet loss and 
the delay jitter value was 32.3%. During a UDP flood 
attack, however, the number of packet loss went up to 14.08% 
while the jitter slightly decreased to 29.7%.   
In 2009, Rui and colleagues [9] conducted a study of 
DDoS prevention based on IP Verify and Threshold Limit. 
The simulation program in this study was .net 2005 running 
on Windows Server 2003 system and the total number of IP 
addresses tested was 12,960,000 IP addresses.  
In 2011, Subramani [4] conducted an experiment on TCP 
and a UDP flood attack and proposed 2 defense 
mechanisms namely Access Control Lists and Threshold 
Limit. The results show that without the attack, the average 
response time of the server was 0.834 milliseconds while 
during the attack this number increased to 8.782 
milliseconds. After using Access Control Lists, the average 
response time went down to 1.093 milliseconds, and it 
reduced to 6.985 milliseconds when using Threshold Limit.    
In 2012, Kaur and colleagues [10] conducted an 
experiment on DDoS Attack using a DETER testbed. The 
network in this experiment consisted of three computers: an 
attacker computer, legitimate computer, and FTP server. 
The purpose of this research was to study the impact of the 
user throughput between computer nodes during a UDP 
flood attack. Traffic result shows that the average 
bandwidth before the attack was around 75Kbps while 
during the attacks, the average bandwidth has raised around 
130Kbps.  
There has been no work done on testing performance and 
defense mechanisms on Web Server with Linux Ubuntu 13. 
The lack of available research on the impact of a DDoS 
attack on Web Server with new generation of Linux 
platform was the main motivation behind this paper.   
3. EXPERIMENT SETUP
The test-bed diagram for site to site is displayed in Figure 1. 
The test-bed hardware setup remained constant for all 
experiments conducted. 
Figure 1: Network test-bed. 
The network was setup through a direct connection using 
a standard category 5e cabling between workstations. The 
router was used to separate two networks, and used to 
monitor incoming and outgoing traffic between networks. 
There were four types of workstations in the test-bed: Two 
workstations will act as attackers, one will act as a victim, 
and another one is used as a monitoring machine. 
The workstations where the attackers perform have 
Hping3 [13] as an attacker generator, which is a built-in 
tool that is offered with Linux Back Track R3. The victim 
machine with Web Server has Linux Ubuntu 13 installed. 
The monitoring PC in which Windows 8 installed is where 
the different varieties of monitoring tools installed to gather 
data and perform the network testing analysis.  
The hardware benchmark comprised of an Intel® Core™ 
i5 2.80 GHz processor with 8.00 GB RAM for the efficient 
operation of operating systems, Cisco 2811 and Cisco SG 
200 were chosen as the network connection devices.   
4. DATA GENERATION AND TRAFFIC
MEASUREMENT TOOL 
TCPing [11] was the primary tool used to investigate the 
latency of the web server during the attack. Latency is a 
measure of time delay experienced in a system. By using 
TCPing we can measure the response times and hence we 
have calculated the latency of the victim computer. 
Iperf [12] was selected as the tool to measure the user 
throughput and packet loss during the attack. Iperf has a 
client and server functionality, and can measure the 
throughput between the two ends, either unidirectional or 
bi-directionally. It is open source software and runs on 
various platforms including Linux, and Windows.  
Hping3 [13] was chosen as an attacker generator, which 
is a built-in tool that is offered with Linux Back Track R3. 
HPing3 allows users to generate different types of DDoS 
attacks including UDP, TCP, and Smurf attack.  
Webstress Server Tool [16] was used to generate 
legitimate traffic. It is software for load and performance 
testing of a webserver. Webstress Server Tool is designed 
to simulate multiple users accessing to a website. 
All performance evaluation tests were run for 5 minutes, 
which generated the attack traffic at approximately 3.5 
million packets per run. The legitimate traffic was 
generated by Webstress Server Tool, which generate the 
connection request from users to the webserver assuming 
on average 10 users per second. To ensure high data 
accuracy, each test was repeated at least 30 times and data 
average and runs continued until standard deviation of 
results was below 0.07% of the average.   
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The experiments were conducted to evaluate and compare 
TCP throughputs, round-trip time and CPU utilization 
before and during the attack on Web Server with Linux 
Ubuntu 13. This section also evaluates four defense 
mechanisms, namely, Access Control Lists, 
Threshold Limit, IP Verify, and Network Load Balancing.  
5.1 Impact of a UDP flood attack on Linux U
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In terms of defenses, Threshold Limit [4] was the most 
effective solution in this study, which increased the 
throughput value from 0.36 to 94 Mbps. Access Control 
Lists [3], Network Load Balancing [6], and IP Verify [5] 
increased moderately the TCP throughput values to 53.37 
Mbps, 47.29 Mbps, and 46.93 Mbps, respectively. 
Figure 6: RTT on Web Server after using DDoS defenses. 
Figure 6 shows the comparison of round-trip time after 
using DDoS defenses on Web Server with Linux Ubuntu 13. 
On the whole, the result shows that the RTT value was 
decreased after using defenses with the exceptions for 
Network Load Balancing. IP Verify was the most effective 
defense in this study, which reduced the RTT from 
26.422ms to 25.604ms. Threshold Limit came in second, 
and reduced the RTT to 25.98ms, while ACLs reduced the 
delay value to 26.007ms.  
Interestingly, Network Load Balancing resulted in the 
highest RTT, which was 26.487ms. It can be noted that this 
number was even higher than the RTT value during the 
attack. The reason is that this defense requires the system 
resources to examine incoming packets and make load-
balancing decisions, and thus impose an overhead on 
network performance [6]. 
Figure 7: CPU utilization on Web Server after using DDoS 
defenses. 
       Figure 7 shows the average CPU utilization before and 
after using DDoS defenses on Web Server with Linux 
Ubuntu 13. The result shows that the CPU usage before the 
attack was stable at around 0.3% to 0.5%. During the attack, 
the CPU usage increased to 24.9%. The most effective 
defense in this study was the Threshold Limit, which 
reduced the CPU usage from 24.9% to 3%. IP Verify 
reduced the server’s CPU to 10%. ACLs reduced the CPU 
usage from 24% to 15%, while Network Load Balancing 
decreased the CPU usage to 18%.  
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the impact of a UDP flood attack 
on Web Server with the new generation of Linux platform, 
namely, Linux Ubuntu 13. The result showed that the TCP 
throughput before the attack was constant at 94.1 Mbps and 
dropped significantly to 0.36 during the attack. The RTT 
result shows the average RTT before the attack was 0.62ms. 
During the attack, the average RTT increased significantly 
to 26.42ms. The CPU result shows that the CPU usage 
before the attack was constant at 0.3% to 0.5%. During the 
attack, the CPU utilization went up to 24%. 
  After using defenses, Threshold Limit was the 
most effective defense, which significantly increased 
the TCP throughput value from 0.36 to 94 Mbps, whereas 
the rest of defenses could increase the throughputs between 
46.93 and 53.37 Mbps. The RTT result after using 
defenses showed that IP Verify was the most effective 
defense as it reduced the RTT value from 26.42ms to 
25.60ms. On the other hand, Network Load Balancing 
resulted in the highest RTT, which increased the 
RTT from 26.422ms to 26.487ms.  After using 
defenses, Threshold Limit significantly reduced the CPU 
usage from 24.9 to 3% whereas the rest of defenses 
reduced the CPU usage ranging from 10% to 18%.    
FUTURE WORKS
In future, we plan to extend this study by incorporating 
latest operating systems such as OS X Lion 10.7, Linux 
Fedora 20, Linux GNOME 3.12, and Windows 8.1 system. 
In addition, the denial of service attack exploiting IPv6 
mobility will be investigated.   
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